With deepest apologies to DaMan, this is meant just for fun.
Miamiair's trivia this morning got me to do some looking around, that's why I didn't submit an answer because it would have been cheating. So I start doing a little reasearch to educate myself on the different aspects of MiG Alley and I run across this Wikipedia article:
It has some good information and is mostly well-written, but then you get into it and see what I have quoted below (I recommend a handful of Tylenol before you start reading).
Now, this was probably written by a non-native English speaker (of Scotty) but it's both funny and hard to read at the same time. There's quite a bit of discussion about it on the "discussion" page too.
The skilled units of the 324th IAD with the 176th GIAP and the 196th IAP with 44 MiGs intercept a force of 48 B-29s escorted by 54 F-84s, 24 F-80C and 18 F-86s in high cover targeting the Sinuiju sector. The MiG well directed by ground control shot down 4 B-29s, a fifth B-29s was hit and damaged ,and his crew bailed out over the Yellow sea and five others B-29s heavy damaged make emergency landing at Kimpo and others airfields, too damaged to return to Okinawa. Also in the same combat, the MiGs shot down two of the escorting F-80Cs. USAF speak about "100 MiGs", in reality as say before they were only 44. Despite the claims by the USAF about 9 or 10 MiG shot down(4 by the F-86A of the 4th FIW, 6 by the B-29s),actually only one MiG was shot down by James Jabara, one plane of the 176th GIAP and a second one of same Regiment, Blue 823 was medium damaged(C/N 108023). Three other MiGs were slight damaged within two to seven 12.7mm bullets hits.
In reality, the B-29s was of the planes most hated and unpopular in the USAF and crews were sometimes very pesimist about his possibilities of ended his operative tour and critic about the utilisation of the type of obsolete bomber in the Korean theater. April 12 was the first warning, and the second and last was the "Black Tuesday". After October 23, 1951, and with the terrible losses in B-29 by MiGs, this bomber was switched definitively to limited night operations.
Even with heavier fighter escorts, B-29 losses mounted throughout the spring and summer of 1951, as the MiG pilots learned how to pick off the lumbering, slow-moving bombers. These efforts climaxed with the disastrous "Black Thursday" battle of October 23, 1951, in which an estimated 100 MiG-15s attacked B-29s and their escorts. Three B-29s were shot down, four crash-landed in South Korea and three more were judged to be beyond repair upon returning to base. After that, daylight bombing raids became a rarity, and even night raids could be deadly. On June 10, 1952, four B-29 crews of the 19th Bomb Group found themselves in Soviet searchlights over Kwaksan in the southern end of MiG Alley. Attacked by 12 MiGs, three bombers went down: one exploded in mid-air, one hit the ground in North Korea and one crash-landed at Kimpo Airfield in the South. MiG-15s also began systematic attacks on jet fighter-bombers, which were the backbone of the U.S. effort to interdict railway operations in North Korea.
Although outnumbered throughout the conflict[citation needed], the F-86 Sabre pilots enjoyed advantages they learned to exploit to the fullest. Foremost among these advantages was a radar ranging gunsight on their six .50 caliber machine guns, which ensured that even short bursts of fire generally found their target. F-86 pilots were also equipped with G-suits, which prevented pilot blackout in high-speed turning maneuvers. Many of the secrets of the F-86 were available for the Soviets after the F-86A-5 49-1319 was shot down by LtCol Pepelyaev October 6, 1951. This plane, also utilised by James Jabara in some of his missions, was forced to make a emergency landing and recovered by the North Korean and handed over to the Soviets. The plane was sent to Soviet Union to study, a very valuable information for the Soviets was the system G in the plane for his pilot combat suit. This day, a "black day" for the 4th FIW 336th FIS, was also shot down the F-86E 50-671 by Konstantin Sheberstov of the 176th GIAP and another F-86A, the 49-1178, was damaged again by Pepelyaev. No MiGs were lost on this day.
Captured also later in the war by one Soviet Commando, an American helicopter for study and investigation.
Later variants of the F-86, particularly the "F" model, came very close to duplicating the MiG in speed and performance. Employing these advantages, and learning the MiG's weaknesses, enabled U.S. pilots to have more success over their opponents, at least according to the US sources.
A good improvement for the MiG's combat safety was the installation from May 1952 of the Serena Warning Device. The device installed in the tail of the MiG can detect the F-86 ranging radar from 10 km and save many MiGs, especially in their vulnerable landing phase. One of the last Soviets kills of the war July 20, 1953 was made with the help of the Serena Warning Device, when six MiGs of the 224th IAP were in landing after a patrol in the Suphun area. The Serena detected the approach of two F-86 in full power, and the two last MiGs in the landing path, Kapt Boris Siskov and his wingman Sn Lt Klimov, evaded the attack. The F-86s tried to maneuver, but it was too late, and the lead F-86 was shot down by Boris Siskov very near the Antung runway. The second F-86 escaped Klimov's fire, flying into a bank of low clouds. That was also the 5th kill of Kapt Siskov, his last and also the last of the 52 Soviet pilots to achieve "Ace" title in Korea.
The better kill score by UN forces was realised by June 1953. USAF submitted claims for 77 MiGs destroyed. Actually the number is a little lower but however was always a impressive 64 MiGs shot down this month. 63 of these kills were obtained with the F-86F and a solitary kill by one F-94B. One Po-2 and two Yak-18 were also destroyed this month by the US Navy units. Of these 64 Jets, 24 were V-VS MiGs and 40 were MiGs of the PLAAF.V-VS losses 10 pilots in combat. The "star" of the month were Ralph S. Parr of the 335 FIS, 4 FIW, with 7 MiGs destroyed(5 V-VS and 2 PLAAF), James Jabara of the 334 FIS, 4 FIW with 5 PLAAF MiGs, Vermont Garrison of the 335 FIS, 4 FIW other 5 also all PLAAF and Loonie Moore of the 335 FIS, 4 FIW with 4 MiGs(2 V-VS and 2 PLAAF). All these pilots were veterans of the skilled 4th FIW. The part of the 51st FIW of these 64 MiGs destroyed was of 22 Kills(10 V-VS and 12 PLAAF). One of the kills, a PLAAF MiG, was scored June 7, 1953 by the future astronaut Edwin E. Aldrin, pilot of the 16 FIS, 51 FIW.
In the same month the MiGs of the V-VS submitted claims for 36 F-86, 4 F-84 and one F-80. In the other side the USAF admitted the loss of 14 F-86 this month. Actually the score by the V-VS and PLAAF was: 18 F-86 (One by the PLAAF the only kill by the Chinese MiGs pilots obtained in June 1953), 4 F-84 and one solitary F-94B. A quite low score of 23 enemy planes destroyed after so a amount of heavy losses, specially by the young and rookies pilots of the PLAAF.By the V-VS the better work was done by the 878th IAP, scoring 10 Kills (7 F-86 and 3 F-84) between June 16 and June 19. This unit had loss 3 MiGs in combat this month.
By the MiGs one of the better months in kill score was October 1951. Claims were for 92 kills, with 16 B-29s, one B-26, 41 F-86, 21 F-84, 12 F-80s and 1 F4U. Actually losses were 5 F-84s, 6 F-80s, 8 F-86s, 1 Meteor and 11 B-29s. USAF claims were for 37 MiGs destroyed by the F-86s of the 4th FIW and B-29 Gunners. Actual losses were 16 MiGs (8 V-VS with 3 pilots and 8 PLAAF MiGs). One MiG of the PLAAF of the 12th Regiment 4th Division flown by Hwa Lung Yi scored the only kill by the Chinese pilots in October 1951: one F-86E of the 4 FIW October 16, 1951.
September 1952 was also a good month for the MiGs. Despite suffering heavy losses, 43 MiGs were shot down this month (19 were downed over his own airfields in landing phase) the Regiments obtain good results claiming 40 F-86, 18 F-84s,2 B-29 and one F4U.Four of the F-86s destroyed were downed September 4, 1952. Actually losses by the USAF and US Navy were 18 F-86, 15 F-84, 2 B-29 and one F4U(USAF admitted the loss of 9 F-86s and 4 F-84s and submitted claims for 63 MiGs destroyed). September 1952 was in reality a "Black Month" for the F-84 equipped units suffering heavy losses.
The U.S. pilots however, had the greatest respect for their opponents and quickly dubbed them "honchos" (Japanese for "big shot"). Facing daunting odds day after day bred in U.S. pilots what became known as "flight-suit attitude," or a cocky self-confidence at being able to tackle any task. This outlook was illustrated by Capt. Joseph C. McConnell, the top U.S. ace of the war with 16 kills, when his wingman estimated the two of them were facing as many as 30 MiGs. "Yeah," McConnell replied. "And we've got 'em all to ourselves."[7]
The PLAAF (Chinese Air Force) flew its first combat mission with the MiG-15 on December 28, 1950. Fresh off training, a flight of the 4th FAD (Fighter Aviation Division) led by Li Han took off with two Russian Zvenos and headed toward the Anju Area. No enemy was found. No other operative missions were flown until January 23, 1951. This day 33 F-84Es of the 27th FEW were intercepted by twenty MiGs of the 29th GIAP over Sinuiju which was reinforced a few minutes later by 13 MiGs of 177th IAP and eight more of the PLAAF 4th FAD 7th Regiment. The Soviet pilots claimed five victories while the Thunderjets claimed four. Actually the only confirmed kills of the day were the one obtained by William Slaughter, who shot down the MiG of Kapetan Grebenkin of the 29th GIAP, who lost his life in that combat, and two PLAAF MiGs shot down by 1st Lt. Jacob Kratt. After these losses, and with four more MiGs of the 12th Regiment lost in collisions and landing accidents in February, it was decided to order the return of the regiment to its home base at Liaoyang by early May and continued the training formation. The 4th FAD and the PLAAF MiGs next missions were flown in September 1951.
Of the 85 kills claimed by the PLAAF in the war, only 37 can be confirmed ,the first one January 29, 1951 a F-80C and the last, one F-86E of the 51st FIW June 4, 1953. Some 18 F-86 were downed by the PLAAF including the F-86E-10-NA 51-2752 flown by the USAF Ace Maj George A. Davis of the 4th FIG, 334th FIS, shot down by Zhang Jihui of the 12th Regiment 4th Division February 10, 1952. The KPAFAC (North Korean Air Force) started to fly missions with MiGs under PLAAF markings at the very end of the war. A total of around 125 MiG-15 aircraft were known to be in Korean hands at the end of the war and may never have flown combat as unitary formations of Korean pilots and aircraft. Only one UN plane was shot down by one KPAFAC MiG, a F-86F of the 4th FIW 336th FIS July 20, 1953.
The standard U.S. fighter formation in MiG Alley was the "finger-four," so-called because it resembled the fingers of a right hand as seen from above. The standard four-ship flight was led by a flight leader, typically the most experienced of the four, in the number one, or "middle-finger," position. The leader was covered on his left by his wingman, typically a less-experienced pilot, in the number two, or "index-finger" position. In the number three, or "ring-finger" position, was the element leader, the second-most experienced pilot. In turn, he was covered on the right by his wingman, flying the number four, or "pinkie finger," position. The latter was usually the most junior man in the flight. Perfected by the Luftwaffe in World War II, the "finger-four" gave good mutual support, and by flying in a more spread-out manner, the formation was very maneuverable and provided wider visual coverage. The flight leader and the element leader were the primary "shooters," with the wingmen assigned to keep their eyes open for threats from behind or above.
The V-VS MiG pilots operation was based in the Zveno formation. A "Para" was formed by two MiGs. Two Pari formed a Zveno.8 to 12 fighters a Eskadra(Squadron). A Polk(Regiment)was formed with 36 MiGs or 3 Eskadry. Regiments were IAP or GIAP, this last a Guard Regiment.72 to 108 MiGs formed a Diviziya (IAD) or Division. A Korpus, like the 64th IAK was formed theorically with 216 MiGs in two or three Diviziya.
In Korea the normal strength of a IAD (Fighter Aviation Regiment) was 48 planes and not the 108 usually deployed with the others V-VS units. Aircraft with the tactical number 01 to 013 were allocated to the 1th Squadron of the Regiment,20 to 31 were allocated to the 2th Squadron while the 3th Squadron had tactical numbers from 40 to 51. In Korea, and under combat conditions and his limitations this rigid system was not always utilised. About markings all MiGs were painted with the KPAFAC (North Korea Air Force) insignias in fuselage sides and underwings. As like the V-VS planes and in a long tradition from WWII ,no stars were painted in the upper wing surfaces. PLAAF insignias with red and white bands in the rudder were utilised in Nov.1950 by the 151st GIAD and 28th IAD. With the deployment of the 50th IAD by December 5, 1950 all MiGs were operated under KPAFAC insignias. Red noses were carried by the GIAP regiments (Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment) but there also many exceptions.
About tactics, the MiGs fought basic in the vertical plane taking all avantages of his excellent climb rate. The squadron was divided into three groups: Attack, Cover and Reserve.Usually the first attack was a head-on pass and then climb for a series of Hit and Run tactics like P-40s with Zeros or Thunderbolts with Luftwaffe fighters. The reserve Party in general at very high altitude,"At the perch", cover the combat zone and can take part at the battle to attack enemy planes in disadvantage position or to reinforce or protect other MiGs. The USAF F-86s pilots called these MiGs the "Casey Jones".
Slider... <sniff, sniff>... you stink.
