paul mcallister wrote:Simulator training or the lack of it was only part of the problem.
The main issue that needs to be at the top of the list is that the aircraft had an inherent design flaw.
A software flaw more than a design flaw. Turn the autostabs off and it still hand flies perfectly fine. The crew that had the aircraft before the Lion Air crash proved that.
paul mcallister wrote:The fact that Boeing were seemingly permitted to certify their own aircraft is also very alarming.
I would agree Boeing should be reprimanded for inserting the MCAS program into the aircraft stabilization mix without telling the airlines and certainly the pilots about it being there, what it was designed to do in the background, and most of all, how to easily disable it in case of malfunction. My concern then becomes what if the pilots deliberately disable the function? It's happened before (think pilots disabling the take off warning of no flaps) and ended up causing fatalities. Human error is the most difficult of all things to completely correct. You can re-engineer an aircraft, hard to re-engineer the human character.
Here also the FAA shares some of the blame as their role is often contradictory. Their mission is to promote aviation, and yet at the same time regulate safety. This case is a glaring example of how the two can be at odds with each other at times. Not sure what the fix would be other than to have two separated entities within the same administration but at some point on the management tree they would be connected. The person at the top would have to have absolute integrity but would probably always be second guessed by know nothing reporters and Congressional aides.
paul mcallister wrote:I think there was a bit of snobbery, and finger pointing from pilots from other countries about the operators training programmes and the air crews skills.
I don't think so. Some of these airlines expand rapidly in the good times and that's been a proven mistake in more than one crash involving pilot error. Other crashes have highlighted how crews are trained to rely heavily on the aircraft automation and when that goes south, might not have the necessary "seat of the pants" skills to pull off a successful recovery.
paul mcallister wrote:Let`s not forget, the flight crew in both the accidents did not intend to die and lose their aircraft when they got on board.
With just a few deliberate individual exceptions, what crew or crewman does?
paul mcallister wrote:For my two-pence worth, I would not fly on a 737 Max. Just my opinion.
One more standby seat available for me then! Thanks!!
I wonder how long it will take for the airlines to get the crews up to speed with training and to dust off and make the necessary software patches before the aircraft can begin flying in sufficient numbers to make a dent in overall operational cost? There's another added box to check for any furloughed pilot coming back to work. If they are tagged to fly the type they'll have to have the additional training before they can rejoin the line. I doubt it will be a simple CBT course either. I would think there would be mandated simulator time.
Looks like American plans to be the fist to re-introduce the aircraft into their regular schedule. But that was proposed in October before the actual requirements to re-introduce the plane were revealed. I would think Southwest would be minutes behind them. Alaska is saying March. Pep, if you make a trip to the last frontier, maybe you get a chance to try one out.
What's the point of an open door policy if inside the open door sits a closed mind?