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FAA Un-Grounds The Boeing 737 MAX

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miamiair (netAirspace FAA) 18 Nov 20, 12:45Post
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ungrounded the Boeing 737 MAX, allowing it to enter commercial service again.

The 737 MAX will be able to rejoin airline fleets as soon as all the tasks in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) regarding returning the aircraft from storage is completed. In addition, the newly-developed software to change the architecture of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) has to be installed as well. So far, Boeing has delivered 387 of the now un-grounded jets to customers across the globe. In addition, 395 built units have waited for the all-clear to be delivered to their final customers. However, some have become “white-tails” – aircraft without an airline’s logo painted on the tailfin, as some customers canceled their orders over the debacle.

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And let's get one thing straight. There's a big difference between a pilot and an aviator. One is a technician; the other is an artist in love with flight. — E. B. Jeppesen
ShanwickOceanic (netAirspace FAA) 18 Nov 20, 20:03Post
Hopefully all concerned have learned the lessons here.

Me, I'll wait for EASA and Transport Canada to follow suit, then wait a full year before upgrading the MAX from "hell no" to "not if I can help it". For one thing, I want to see the local ones go through a full Nordic winter.

Not that the -800s are entirely trustworthy in winter either. {boxed}
Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast:
For it is the number of a man; and its number is One hundred threescore and twelve.
GQfluffy (Database Editor & Founding Member) 18 Nov 20, 22:14Post
Well...you lot still use the ATR in icing conditions across the Pond. :))
Teller of no, fixer of everything, friend of the unimportant and all around good guy; the CAD Monkey
ShanwickOceanic (netAirspace FAA) 18 Nov 20, 22:20Post
Tell me about it {crazy}
Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast:
For it is the number of a man; and its number is One hundred threescore and twelve.
ShyFlyer (Founding Member) 19 Nov 20, 04:58Post
ShanwickOceanic wrote:Hopefully all concerned have learned the lessons here.

{thumbsup} Indeed.


As for me, I'd fly on one right now. I'd lick the seat before I sat down too. 8)
OTS UFN
Fumanchewd 19 Nov 20, 05:01Post
I have no issues flying on the MAX. I would have no issues flying on the old MAX on a proper airline, an airline with proper training programs. My issue would be flying on Lion Air, which I wouldn't do before the crash. I remember a period where they were running off runways as consistently as the moon was full with well documented training and maintenance issues. The Ethiopian Captain never bothered using the MAX simulator they had and were supposed to train on- I understand they had a MAX simulator and were supposed to train, but the training program was never formally finalized as a requirement to fly the MAX. {bugeye} The history of training and issues was the x factor IMO, but this isn't acceptable in our padded-for-safety world. That the MAX wasn't full proof, even to those who ignored training on it, is unacceptable in modern times with our media environment.

I know my opinion is not popular, but I believe it to be true.

The timing on all of this is interesting.... not conspiracy theory interesting, just how things worked out.

Many airlines were upset with the delay, but because of COVID, many are happy they had not taken deliveries before the downturn. Some genuinely still want them, Southwest will start retiring some of their older NG's quick, they were supposed to last year.
You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.
paul mcallister 19 Nov 20, 12:51Post
Simulator training or the lack of it was only part of the problem.
The main issue that needs to be at the top of the list is that the aircraft had an inherent design flaw. The fact that Boeing were seemingly permitted to certify their own aircraft is also very alarming.
I think there was a bit of snobbery, and finger pointing from pilots from other countries about the operators training programmes and the air crews skills.
Let`s not forget, the flight crew in both the accidents did not intend to die and lose their aircraft when they got on board.

For my two-pence worth, I would not fly on a 737 Max. Just my opinion.
Fumanchewd 19 Nov 20, 15:28Post
paul mcallister wrote:Simulator training or the lack of it was only part of the problem.
The main issue that needs to be at the top of the list is that the aircraft had an inherent design flaw. The fact that Boeing were seemingly permitted to certify their own aircraft is also very alarming.
I think there was a bit of snobbery, and finger pointing from pilots from other countries about the operators training programmes and the air crews skills.
Let`s not forget, the flight crew in both the accidents did not intend to die and lose their aircraft when they got on board.

For my two-pence worth, I would not fly on a 737 Max. Just my opinion.


I'm no sure why you think intent of the pilots has anything to do with the conversation? We can get into the specifics as well, but that should probably be for another thread. Keeping it simple, would you fly your family on Lion Air? When living in Singapore a few years ago and making a few trips, I considered their cheap flights but decided their safety record was horrendous so never flew them. No "snobbery" here, I few on Thai, SIA, Scoot, Cebu, Tiger and on and on. The only airline I would not fly was Lion because they literally crashed every other month for a period. I certainly would not fly with my family on them and after reviewing the MAX situation would feel perfectly safe on the MAX. I've flown on far far more dangerous aircraft with family, and proper training did help other airlines not have crashes. To me an airline with a proper history of maintenance and training is the most important x factor....

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/worl ... lures.html
You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.
DXing 19 Nov 20, 18:13Post
paul mcallister wrote:Simulator training or the lack of it was only part of the problem.
The main issue that needs to be at the top of the list is that the aircraft had an inherent design flaw.


A software flaw more than a design flaw. Turn the autostabs off and it still hand flies perfectly fine. The crew that had the aircraft before the Lion Air crash proved that.

paul mcallister wrote:The fact that Boeing were seemingly permitted to certify their own aircraft is also very alarming.


I would agree Boeing should be reprimanded for inserting the MCAS program into the aircraft stabilization mix without telling the airlines and certainly the pilots about it being there, what it was designed to do in the background, and most of all, how to easily disable it in case of malfunction. My concern then becomes what if the pilots deliberately disable the function? It's happened before (think pilots disabling the take off warning of no flaps) and ended up causing fatalities. Human error is the most difficult of all things to completely correct. You can re-engineer an aircraft, hard to re-engineer the human character.

Here also the FAA shares some of the blame as their role is often contradictory. Their mission is to promote aviation, and yet at the same time regulate safety. This case is a glaring example of how the two can be at odds with each other at times. Not sure what the fix would be other than to have two separated entities within the same administration but at some point on the management tree they would be connected. The person at the top would have to have absolute integrity but would probably always be second guessed by know nothing reporters and Congressional aides.

paul mcallister wrote:I think there was a bit of snobbery, and finger pointing from pilots from other countries about the operators training programmes and the air crews skills.


I don't think so. Some of these airlines expand rapidly in the good times and that's been a proven mistake in more than one crash involving pilot error. Other crashes have highlighted how crews are trained to rely heavily on the aircraft automation and when that goes south, might not have the necessary "seat of the pants" skills to pull off a successful recovery.

paul mcallister wrote:Let`s not forget, the flight crew in both the accidents did not intend to die and lose their aircraft when they got on board.


With just a few deliberate individual exceptions, what crew or crewman does?

paul mcallister wrote:For my two-pence worth, I would not fly on a 737 Max. Just my opinion.


One more standby seat available for me then! Thanks!! :))

I wonder how long it will take for the airlines to get the crews up to speed with training and to dust off and make the necessary software patches before the aircraft can begin flying in sufficient numbers to make a dent in overall operational cost? There's another added box to check for any furloughed pilot coming back to work. If they are tagged to fly the type they'll have to have the additional training before they can rejoin the line. I doubt it will be a simple CBT course either. I would think there would be mandated simulator time.

Looks like American plans to be the fist to re-introduce the aircraft into their regular schedule. But that was proposed in October before the actual requirements to re-introduce the plane were revealed. I would think Southwest would be minutes behind them. Alaska is saying March. Pep, if you make a trip to the last frontier, maybe you get a chance to try one out.
What's the point of an open door policy if inside the open door sits a closed mind?
ShanwickOceanic (netAirspace FAA) 19 Nov 20, 19:16Post
Fumanchewd wrote: My issue would be flying on Lion Air, which I wouldn't do before the crash. I remember a period where they were running off runways as consistently as the moon was full with well documented training and maintenance issues.

Even in Indonesian terms, Lion Air are downright scary. My first thought on hearing about this crash was "What did they do this time?" Having said this, that MAX did try to kill the previous crew, who dealt with it and got the thing back on the ground in one piece.

DXing wrote:My concern then becomes what if the pilots deliberately disable the function?

As I understand it, not a lot. There were some changed handling characteristics that were thought different enough to make a common type rating difficult, but I've not seen anything to suggest that these were of the stall-spin-crash-burn variety. All MCAS did (or was supposed to do) was keep the aircraft below the angle of attack where these characteristics would occur - an angle that you shouldn't see during normal operations anyway - so that you'd never see the differences and hence "didn't need" simulator training. Talking of which:

paul mcallister wrote:Simulator training or the lack of it was only part of the problem.

Indeed, but we were supposed to have figured out after Kegworth (another brand new version of the 737) that you can't just give someone some reading material instead of a sim ride and expect not to create a smoking hole. How quickly we forget.
Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast:
For it is the number of a man; and its number is One hundred threescore and twelve.
JLAmber (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 20 Nov 20, 21:09Post
ShanwickOceanic wrote:Indeed, but we were supposed to have figured out after Kegworth (another brand new version of the 737) that you can't just give someone some reading material instead of a sim ride and expect not to create a smoking hole. How quickly we forget.


This. 100% this. If the MAX debacle has shown us anything it's that cutting corners is always going to cost you in the long-term. This time it was 346 lives and the most expensive grounding in aviation history. There shouldn't be a next time. We have the technology to ensure those mistakes are eliminated during the design process and in the comprehensive retraining of pilots moving to new variants. The old excuses of training costs, delays into service etc. are just non-starters after this.
A million great ideas...
 

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