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737 MAX: Committee Report Out

All about Airlines and Airliners.

ShanwickOceanic (netAirspace FAA) 16 Sep 20, 21:05Post
Technical design flaws, faulty assumptions about pilot responses, and management failures by both The Boeing Company (Boeing) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) played instrumental and causative roles in the chain of errors that led to the crashes of Lion Air flight 610 in October 2018, and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 in March 2019, that resulted in the tragic and preventable deaths of 346 people..

Full report: ... elease.pdf
Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast:
For it is the number of a man; and its number is One hundred threescore and twelve.
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 16 Sep 20, 21:58Post
Read a bunch of it. It's as expected. What shameful mark on American aviation. This was notable:

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ShyFlyer (Founding Member) 17 Sep 20, 03:21Post
It wouldn't surprise me if this means the end of the 737 line.
DXing 18 Sep 20, 13:32Post
One way of the other this was always going to be the final iteration of the 737. Short of fusion drive engines or some other sort of Flash Gordon invention there was just no place left to go.

I have a sticker on on my backpack, "Forget the mistake, remember the lesson". Boeing would be well served by it. If you have to jump through as many hoops as they did to make this thing work, it most likely wasn't worth the trouble. And it wasn't. The big flag should have been having to put MCAS on the 737 MAX to begin with. The big sin was not telling operators about it until after a crash.

I've wondered why they did that, not include it in the flight manual that is? It would have had to be included in the maintenance manual so how long did they think it would be until discovery by the pilot group? Seems like a very poor decision on the part of Boeing management. In the end it came back to bite them a whole lot faster than they probably imagined it would. So the mistake was made, the lesson learned should be to never hide a critical component like MCAS ever again, no matter the complexity.

There have been other aircraft with fatal design flaws that after correction went on to serve long useful lives and I expect the same for the 737 MAX. It's a shame it will be forever remembered for its start in the business but if the flaws are demonstrably fixed, time to get it back in the air.
What's the point of an open door policy if inside the open door sits a closed mind?
CALTECH 05 Oct 20, 14:34Post
MCOMX has stopped, for now, performing Mods and MX on the 737MAX-9s. Too much work is piling up. These aircraft need checks and inspections performed based on time. With the work that was performed at MCO, then sending them back into storage only to have to perform the same MX the next time the aircraft come out of storage, was just wasting money. Think someone was anticipating a early RTS which didn't happen.

Boeing screwed the pooch. Took their 'Safety First' culture and replaced it a 'share value' idiocy. Running a safety system with a single sensor is unbelievable.

The flight crews should have at the very least, killed the Stab Trim. With the trim wheels moving and the nose pointing down uncommanded, it should have been a memorized item.

And a prior incident with Lion Air on the flight before, that's why every problem and MX issue should get documented.

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