Reports are emerging that the Russian Air Forces lost as many as eight aircraft during the Georgian conflict. The Russian defense ministry claims only four were destroyed. The confirmed losses are of three Su-25s and one Tu-22M3. Two Russian aircrew were captured and exchanged while five more were killed. This includes one case of friendly fire.
Confirmed losses were three Sukhoi Su-25 “Frogfoot” ground-attack aircraft, along with a Tupolev Tu-22M3 “Backfire C” bomber. These losses occurred on Aug. 8, 2008, the first day of the battle. Two Russian aircrew were captured and exchanged. Another five were killed (one by fratricide), according to additional analysis from a Russian military think tank. According to US intelligence reports, an Su-24 was also lost. The Moscow Defense Brief claims they have identified that the following aircraft were lost: an Au-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, am Su-24M strike aircraft and an Mil Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopter. Another three Su-25 Frogfoots were damaged but returned to their bases.
U.S. intelligence analysts say they are skeptical, and put credence to only one unreported loss—an Su-24 “Fencer.”
However, both U.S. and Russian analysts contend that the conflict provides clues about future battles between conventional forces and portends the need for modern militaries to prepare for more than insurgencies.
The Russian air force is believed to have advanced capabilities for detecting enemy air defenses and attacking them, but they have largely failed to field and train with the capability. That is because it has been too long since the service had to fight a modern air war.
In terms of antiradiation missiles, Russia has fielded the Kh-31P (AS-17B) rocket-ramjet-powered missile—which is integrated on the Su-24M. However, the variant currently in use relies on three discrete seeker heads covering specific threat bands. A wideband seeker is in development but is not yet thought to have been introduced into service.
Former commander-in-chief of the Russian air force, Gen. Anatoly Kornukov, blamed Russian intelligence for failing to analyze the numbers, locations and capabilities of the Georgian air defense. He also said there was no attempt to attack the air defenses and that inappropriate aircraft, such as the Tu-22M3 bomber, were used for tactical missions.
Operational commanders in the U.S. agree that the world of aerial combat is changing quickly and technology must be leveraged to stay ahead of new air defenses, particularly those called “double-digit SAMs.” They encompass a range of Russian-made weapons such as the S-300 family that includes the NATO-designated SA-10 “Grumble” and SA-20 “Gargoyle” as well as the S-400 SA-21 “Growler.” Advanced man-portable air defense systems (Manpads) include the Igla family, such as the SA-16 “Gimlet,” SA-18 “Grouse” and the SA-24 “Grinch.” Russia is also working on a follow-on system to the Igla. To get through such defenses will require new techniques.
“The buzzword is cyberwarfare. Finessing air defenses “is very different than 10-15 years ago. Then it was penetration [using stealth] and precision [bombing]. Access has a whole different definition that starts with electronics and cyber. Today, a 2,000-lb. bomb, Tomahawk or JASSM can’t get to a target without entering the cyberworld to achieve the survivability that’s given to us only by electronic attack.
The asymmetric advantage is how communications are utilized—the command and control of forces. If the adversary’s ability to command and control can be influenced, impact and affect will allow the defense of the attacking forces.
The F-22 and the F-35 will have this [electronic attack and surveillance] capability. They will continuously absorb information. That information can be put to multiple uses. As time goes by, stealth will be compromised. So both stealth and speed [in a single package], since the deeper into hostile territory the mission, the more this will be apparent. With this airborne electronic attack capability, key objectives are to find the decision nodes, the seams and logistics failure points in the electronic realm.
As for the F-35, concepts of operation are already being considered that would see the aircraft use its active, electronically scanned array radar to jam SAM radars to support one or more other F-35s. The intent would be to significantly degrade SAM radar performance, thereby improving the survivability and the lethality of the fighter.
The new Moscow Defense Brief analysis credits the two Russian Su-24 losses to Georgian shoulder-fired, man-portable air defense missiles and the Russian Su-25 to friendly fire from a Russian-wielded Manpad. The three Georgian Su-25s were shot down by Russian Manpads as well. Russian officials say their four recognized losses fell victim to relatively sophisticated, Buk-M1 (SA-11 “Gadfly”) surface-to-air missiles fielded by the Georgians.
Even early analysis of the air war between Georgia and Russia made it obvious that Russian forces had not planned or trained for a coordinated attack against Georgian air defenses. The conflict also signaled a new era in that it was the first time the Russian air force—or for that matter anyone else—has battled a modern air-defense system, which was illustrated by use of the Buk M1, a product of the 1980s.
Through the invasion of Iraq in 2003, forces around the world have been pitted against weapons designed in the 1950-60s, although often upgraded with digital components. The exception may be new-generation Manpads such as the SA-16, which has been used against U.S. helicopters in Iraq, and the SA-18. The latter is supposed to be confined to use by Russian forces, but a number of them have already found their way into U.S. test laboratories via the black market. There also is concern that the SA-18 is in Afghanistan.
And let's get one thing straight. There's a big difference between a pilot and an aviator. One is a technician; the other is an artist in love with flight. — E. B. Jeppesen
