You are at netAirspace : Forum : Air and Space Forums : Civil Aviation

Atlas Air 763F N1217A operating 5Y3591 MIA - IAH for Amazon Prime Air lost radio contact at around 1300 ft while over Trinity Bay on approach to IAH . Very early reports suggest there are three crew onboard.

https://abc13.com/crews-responding-to-c ... y/5153229/

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/airc ... a#1f98a1ae

Not Good... Debris Field from live chopper looks like there's nothing left, small debris littered everywhere in the water.

Confirmed, no survivors.

https://www.click2houston.com/news/boei ... d-faa-says

Whatever happened happened fast, last two ADSB position reports show a descent rate of 4,750 FPM then 7,000 FPM respectively.

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/GTI ... H/tracklog

ATC audio, nothing unusual (GIANT 3591), but there were storms in the area at the time. First unanswered call from ATC is at 9:30, then a query if someone hears an ELT:

She fell out of the sky rapidly. Poor buggers.

March 12 update from NTSB. Things don't look good.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/pag ... ma086.aspx

"Air traffic control communications and radar data indicated the flight was normal from Miami to the Houston terminal area. About 12:30 pm the pilots contacted the Houston terminal radar approach control (TRACON) arrival controller and reported descending for runway 26L; the airplane was at 17,800 ft with a ground speed 320 knots.

At 12:34, the airplane was descending through 13,800 ft, and the controller advised of an area of light to heavy precipitation along the flight route and that they could expect vectors around the weather. (See figure 2.)

About 12:35, the flight was transferred to the Houston TRACON final controller, and the pilot reported they had received the Houston Automatic Terminal Information System weather broadcast. The controller told the pilots to expect vectors to runway 26L and asked if they wanted to go to the west or north of the weather.

Radar data indicated the airplane continued the descent through 12,000 ft with a ground speed of 290 knots, consistent with the arrival procedure. The pilots responded that they wanted to go to the west of the area of precipitation. The controller advised that to do so, they would need to descend to 3,000 ft expeditiously.

About 12:37, the controller instructed the pilots to turn to a heading of 270°. Radar data indicated the airplane turned, and the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated a selected heading of 270°. The airplane was descending through 8,500 ft at this time (figure 3).

About 12:38, the controller informed the pilots that they would be past the area of weather in about 18 miles, that they could expect a turn to the north for a base leg to the approach to runway 26L, and that weather was clear west of the precipitation area. The pilots responded, “sounds good” and “ok.” At this time, radar and ADS-B returns indicated the airplane levelled briefly at 6,200 ft and then began a slight climb to 6,300 ft.

Also, about this time, the FDR data indicated that some small vertical accelerations consistent with the airplane entering turbulence. Shortly after, when the airplane’s indicated airspeed was steady about 230 knots, the engines increased to maximum thrust, and the airplane pitch increased to about 4° nose up. The airplane then pitched nose down over the next 18 seconds to about 49° in response to nose-down elevator deflection. The stall warning (stick shaker) did not activate.

FDR, radar, and ADS-B data indicated that the airplane entered a rapid descent on a heading of 270°, reaching an airspeed of about 430 knots. A security camera video (figure 4) captured the airplane in a steep, generally wings-level attitude until impact with the swamp. FDR data indicated that the airplane gradually pitched up to about 20 degrees nose down during the descent.

The airplane was manufactured in 1992 as a Boeing 767-375 in a passenger configuration and was equipped with GE CF-6 engines. It was converted to a freighter configuration in 2017. Maintenance records showed the airplane had 91,063 hours and 23,316 cycles at the time of the accident. There were no outstanding airworthiness directives or inoperative items.

Company records indicated that the captain was qualified and current in the airplane and held an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with type ratings for the B757/767 and EMB145. He had a current FAA first class medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses. He had worked for Atlas Air since September 2015 and had about 11,000 hours total flight experience with about 1,250 hours of experience in the Boeing 767.

The first officer was qualified and current in the airplane and held an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with type ratings for the B757/767, EMB145, and EMB170/190. He had a current FAA first class medical certificate with a limitation for glasses for near vision. He had worked for Atlas Air since July 2017 and had about 5,000 hours total flight experience with about 520 hours of experience in the Boeing 767.

A cockpit voice recorder (CVR) group was convened and will complete a transcript of the entire event. The CVR transcript will be released when the public docket is opened. Other groups include operations/human factors, ATC, weather, structures, systems, powerplants, and maintenance records. Further groups may be formed as the investigation progresses."

The airplane then pitched nose down over the next 18 seconds to about 49° in response to nose-down elevator deflection. The stall warning (stick shaker) did not activate.

I'm calling it: Clearly MCAS. Ground them all.

By how I read this, there are no signs pointing towards an inflight breakup. The absence of a stick shaker warning also indicates they did not stall the aircraft.

Pure guesswork ahead - the most likely scenario to me seems that improperly secured cargo started shifting in the hold when they hit turbulence.

Other possible causes - microburst, faulty sensors leading to wrong flight parameters, or an intentional crash caused by the PF - guess they all seem possible, but not necessarily likely.

Multiple possible causes, but why was full power applied right before the nose dove.

CVR transcript will be crucial.

extender wrote:Multiple possible causes, but why was full power applied right before the nose dove.

I'm not a pilot, but if the aircraft suddenly starts acting weird, I guess you would want full power to be available, in order to have a chance to resolve the situation.

Of course, the same would apply if you decide to ram the thing straight into the ground.

CVR will indeed be the key. Question is, will it be a "okay, here's what I'm going to do" kind of transcript, or rather a "what the hell is going on here?" one.

Interesting that they changed the reading from "due to control column input" to what it is now.

Zak wrote:I'm not a pilot, but if the aircraft suddenly starts acting weird, I guess you would want full power to be available...

Not necessarily. Just because the aircraft "starts acting weird" doesn't mean full power is automatically applied. There are certain situations that call for full power, but it's not a "when in doubt, balls to the wall" type of thing.

Ooof.

Poor buggers. Really does make one wonder if the cargo broke free...

GQfluffy wrote:Ooof.

Poor buggers. Really does make one wonder if the cargo broke free...

Cargo breaking free isn't going to push the power levers to max power...

GQfluffy wrote:Ooof.

Poor buggers. Really does make one wonder if the cargo broke free...

Yeah....reminds me of the video of that cargo 747 that crashed after takeoff from Bagram, I think.

vikkyvik wrote:

GQfluffy wrote:Ooof.

Poor buggers. Really does make one wonder if the cargo broke free...

Yeah....reminds me of the video of that cargo 747 that crashed after takeoff from Bagram, I think.

National 744F N949CA at Bagram, experienced catastrophic load shift. As in this case it also looked like the pilots were trying to get the nose up right until the end.

UPDATE: There has been no update! I expect that we'd have heard something by now if it were a flaw in the a/c.

JLAmber wrote:

vikkyvik wrote:

GQfluffy wrote:Ooof.

Poor buggers. Really does make one wonder if the cargo broke free...

Yeah....reminds me of the video of that cargo 747 that crashed after takeoff from Bagram, I think.

National 744F N949CA at Bagram, experienced catastrophic load shift. As in this case it also looked like the pilots were trying to get the nose up right until the end.

I believe that nose up was the condition that brought the National aircraft down. The loadmasters manual was wrong and not enough straps were applied to the load and those that were, were applied incorrectly. When the load broke free it broke through the rear bulkhead and damaged the elevator jackscrew causing a nose up condition that no amount of pilot input would have been able to correct for. That is why in the videos you never see any sort of stall recovery attempted, they simply couldn't.

Got this a few weeks ago, from an anonymous source. Naturally, I cannot verify the accuracy of the information, though I don't have any immediate reason to doubt it.

Disclaimer: this will not be an easy-to-stomach read.

The initial bobble is from turbulence at 6200'. When the FO called for flaps 1, the captain accidentally hit the GA button. GA didn't engage until after flaps were set to 1, which then brought engine power to full, and started the initial pitch of 10 degrees nose up.

The FO was startled, and shoved the nose forward... The CVR is startling, and baffling. The CA was pulling so hard against the FO that he sheared the pins on the stick and at that point had no control.

They were IMC at the time. When they broke out of into VMC, the FO said 'oh shit' and started to pull. That was the round out you see. I won't get into anything more until everything comes out.

The records, the CVR, and what happened in the flight deck is truly shocking. They hit a negative 4G dive initially on the FO's push. All you hear is stuff hitting the ceiling and at one point a loud thud. They think the thud may have been the JS hitting the ceiling and maybe not wearing the shoulder harness.

This is the accident in a nutshell. The facts that will come out are shocking.

Zak wrote:Got this a few weeks ago, from an anonymous source. Naturally, I cannot verify the accuracy of the information, though I don't have any immediate reason to doubt it.

Disclaimer: this will not be an easy-to-stomach read.

The initial bobble is from turbulence at 6200'. When the FO called for flaps 1, the captain accidentally hit the GA button. GA didn't engage until after flaps were set to 1, which then brought engine power to full, and started the initial pitch of 10 degrees nose up.

The FO was startled, and shoved the nose forward... The CVR is startling, and baffling. The CA was pulling so hard against the FO that he sheared the pins on the stick and at that point had no control.

They were IMC at the time. When they broke out of into VMC, the FO said 'oh shit' and started to pull. That was the round out you see. I won't get into anything more until everything comes out.

The records, the CVR, and what happened in the flight deck is truly shocking. They hit a negative 4G dive initially on the FO's push. All you hear is stuff hitting the ceiling and at one point a loud thud. They think the thud may have been the JS hitting the ceiling and maybe not wearing the shoulder harness.

This is the accident in a nutshell. The facts that will come out are shocking.

Oh goodness. If that's accurate...just horrible. I guess it would explain why it looks like the airplane is just starting to try to pull up in that one bit of footage that's out there.

That is why I believe the information to be accurate. It matches the details that are already known, and it would also explain why there is no rush to publish the official report - because there is not a lot that plane makers and operators can learn from this crash.

Zak wrote:

extender wrote:Multiple possible causes, but why was full power applied right before the nose dove.

I'm not a pilot, but if the aircraft suddenly starts acting weird, I guess you would want full power to be available, in order to have a chance to resolve the situation.

Generally yes... But, the most basic flight training puts in your head to stabilize before adding any power. Even on a time sensitive engine-out on take off, you want to be kicking the rudder and ailerons as pushing the throttles. Power with no control is death, particularly if you are in an aircraft that will yaw over with assymetrical thrust when below or near Vmc.

I speak to Atlas pilots regularly and my perception of them is that many of them are very very experienced guys from the stick and rudder days, although I am sure that many of them are retiring.

'Just FYI, we've heard the full cockpit audio and seen the data. Here's... what really happened (name redacted to protect the innocent!):

During the approach, at about 6,000 FT (being flown by the first officer), the Captain reached around the throttle quadrant to extend the flaps to the next position after being called to do so by the first officer (pilot flying), very normal.

In many aircraft including the 767, that's a very odd/difficult repositioning of your hand (from the left seat, all the way around to the right side of the center console), and requires intimate familiarity and slow deliberate motion to do successfully.

Well in any case, it was not done so this time. The captain accidently hit the 'go around' switch while bringing his hand around for the flaps, which brought both engines up to full power. In the landing configuration, as this aircraft was transitioning into, that obviously causes a vast increase in lift, and the first officer (pilot flying) used everything he had to force the nose back down.
Still not sure why that occurred, as the crew should have just 'gone around' and tried it again when properly configured, but they did not. And that started in motion a chain of events that lead to tragedy.

As the First Officer over-rotated downward, again with the engines at full power, the aircraft quickly accelerated and approached something we're all trained to handle (at least in good training environments), an 'upset recovery', countered by NON-AUTOMATION and basic 'stick and rudder skills'.

This captain however, in turn, grabbed the controls without using positive command ('I've got', 'My aircraft', or anything normally done), and countered the F/O's control input by completely hauling his control column full aft, remember, while the F/O is pushing full forward.

In the process of doing that, he broke the 'shear pin' on his control column (a device/mechanical safety interlock used to separate a control column from the 'innards' of the control architecture in the event one control column is doing something it should not), and that occurred here.

The captain, a few seconds later, now accelerating downward out of the control envelope of the 767 (remember, all of this started at 6000 FT and probably took less time to get to the fatal point than it did to read this far), recognizes the has no control column and then asks the F/O to pull up, get the nose up, or something to that affect. It isn't 100% clear what he says.
The F/O then tries to pull aft on his column (going from full forward to full aft), but isn’t getting the response he needs, because the aircraft is out of the envelope of controllability and the controls are 'air-loaded' in position.

At about 2000 FT, eventually the trim motors are able to start overcoming the air-load, and the aircraft begins to attempt to arrest its rate of descent, but alas it's far too little, far too late, and the aircraft impacts about 30-40 degrees nose down, with what is believed to be about 4-5000 FT / minute rate of descent.

All during this time the throttles aren't touched until somewhere during that last few seconds of flight, which is believed to be what enabled the trim motors to start working. Unclear who does it, and no audio indicates who it was.

Just FYI, we've attempted in our 767 simulators to recover from the event with the exact same setup, and thus far we've only had success when starting at 8000' 'or higher' meaning we are fully established in the 'out of control' position at 8000', recognize it by then, and initiate recovery starting at 8000'.

These guys started the whole thing at 6000' and were much lower when a true recovery attempt was initiated. No chance, and just shows you how quickly you can 'get out of the envelope' when you don't follow procedure, try some completely erroneous recovery technique, and don't have a clue what you're doing.

So many things went wrong with crew coordination, basic flying skills, aircraft envelope awareness, basic procedures, and such that this will likely go down as one of the absolute worst pilot error events ever.

It needs to have serious impact throughout the Amazon flying circus (and associated partnerships), and show people that Jeff Bezos' attempt to push the envelope at lower cost, all things else be damned, doesn't apply to aviation.

This accident no doubt was absolutely horrible, and three people lost their lives one of them (the jumpseater) through absolutely no fault of his own. But making an approach into Houston, TX, it could have been so much worse. In another few miles, they would have been over major population centers and who knows what would have happened then.'

Read that the F/O had a history of pushing the column full forward in stall training. Heard there were problems with that at Mesa and one other regional carrier. The usual charges of racism cropped up, and many links 'disappeared'.

Interesting to see the final NTSB report, see if it corroborates the above.