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Atlas Air 763F Down On Approach To IAH

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CALTECH 20 Jul 19, 06:28Post
DXing wrote:I believe that nose up was the condition that brought the National aircraft down. The loadmasters manual was wrong and not enough straps were applied to the load and those that were, were applied incorrectly. When the load broke free it broke through the rear bulkhead and damaged the elevator jackscrew causing a nose up condition that no amount of pilot input would have been able to correct for. That is why in the videos you never see any sort of stall recovery attempted, they simply couldn't.


You meant horizontal stabilizer jack screw ?
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 21 Dec 19, 03:12Post
As noted in the NAS Daily, a document deluge was given out. From Simon's avherald amendment http://avherald.com/h?article=4c497c3c/0000&opt=0, I found this interesting and sad:

On Dec 19th 2019 the NTSB opened their public docket, no preliminary report was released so far.

Editorial notes: Information is spread over a flurry of different group reports and data files. It is thus very difficult to work out what might have contributed to the crash. There is one shout in the CVR transcript, that stands out and does not fit the scenario the aircraft performance study paints. The FO exclaims: "12:38:45.9 CAM-2 (where's) my speed my speed [Spoken in elevated voice.]" What does this mean? Did he lose the speed indication? Did his speed indication go outside the flight envelope prompting the following "stall" calls? Did the first officer refer to his feel rather than the instruments when he called the stall? And why would the captain also provide nose down inputs if his instruments were good just with the first officer shouting, or were the fligt controls still connected with the first officer pushing both yokes forward? But then, why would the captain still provide nose down inputs on the left hand elevator, though to a less extent than the first officer, after the elevators split? How did the Go Around Mode activate? What role played the apparent ADI/HSI failure and the EFIS Switch mentioned by the First Officer, was the switch indeed moved and the indications returned to normal, or was the switch not moved and the first officer saw erroneous data on his ADI/HSI? In summary, the docket does not yet provide any clear indication of all the facts leading to the crash.

In the operational factors/human performance report the chairman reports the captain (60, ATPL, 11,172 hours total, 1,252 hours on type) was pilot mpnitoring, the first officer (44, ATPL, 5,073 hours total, 520 hours on type) was pilot flying.


In the ACARS report no messages indicating system failures were contained. The report closes with a message of dispatch to the crew asking "PLS COFIRM STATUS....R U OK".

The flight data recorder group presented the table of raw flight data, however, did not provide any interpretation or graphical representation of the data.

The cockpit voice recorder group provided a transcipt, the last decisive minute reads (-1 captain, -2 first officer, -3 observer, HOT flight crew audio panel voice or sound source, CAM Cockpit Area Microphone voice or sound source, RDO Radio transmission from the aircraft, APR transmission from Houston Approach):

12:38:02.2 HOT-2 'kay flaps one.
12:38:04.8 CAM [Sound of mechanical click.]
12:38:05.1 HOT-2 thank you.
12:38:06.1 HOT-1 confirm. confirm.
12:38:07.3 HOT-2 execute.
12:38:08.7 HOT-1 LNAVs available.
12:38:09.9 HOT-2 LNAV is...
12:38:14.3 HOT-1 not on intercept heading.
12:38:15.0 HOT-2 no (your on/it's on) a heading right?
12:38:16.7 HOT-1 oh we're supposed to be on heading- yeah.
12:38:17.9 HOT-2 yeah.
12:38:31.1 CAM [Sound of click.]
12:38:35.1 APP Giant thirty-five ninety-one in about another eighteen miles or so we'll cut you due north(bound) for a base leg.
12:38:40.3 CAM [Sound of four beeps within a duration of .75 seconds at a frequency of 1200 Hz.]3
12:38:41.4 RDO-1 sounds good uh Giant thirty-five ninety-one.
12:38:43.6 APP it is severe clear on the other side of this stuff so you'll have no problem gettin' the airport *(either).
12:38:43.6 CAM-2 (oh)
12:38:44.0 CAM [Sound similar to a mechanical click.]
12:38:45.0 CAM-2 woah. [Spoken in elevated voice.]
12:38:45.9 CAM-2 (where's) my speed my speed [Spoken in elevated voice.]
12:38:46.9 CAM [Sound similar to louder mechanical click.]
12:38:47.3 RDO-1 okay.
12:38:47.9 CAM [Sound similar to multiple random thumping noises.]
12:38:48.0 HOT-2 we're stalling. [Spoken in elevated voice.]
12:38:50.5 HOT-2 stall. [Exclaimed.]
12:38:51.9 HOT-? #.
12:38:52.3 HOT-2 oh Lord have mercy myself. [Spoken in elevated voice.]
12:38:53.3 CAM [Sound similar to multiple random thumping noises.]
12:38:53.9 HOT-2 Lord have mercy. [Exclaimed.]
12:38:55.1 HOT-2 @Capt. [Spoken in elevated voice.]
12:38:55.7 HOT-1 what's goin' on?
12:38:56.0 HOT-2 (Lord)– [Spoken in elevated voice.]
12:38:56.3 CAM [Sound of 1000 Hz series of beeps with approximately .25 second spacing begin. Group could not determine if audible sound lasted until end of recording.] 4
12:38:56.4 HOT-2 @Capt. [Spoken in elevated voice.]
12:38:56.6 CAM-3 what's goin' on? [Spoken in an elevated voice.]
12:38:56.8 HOT-? [Sound of rapid breathing.]
12:38:57.4 HOT-2 @Capt-
12:38:58.1 CAM [Sound of quick series of four beeps at 1200 Hz.] 5
12:38:58.9 CAM [Sound of longer duration pulse tone about 1000 Hz, similar to Siren. Group could not determine if audible sounds lasted until end of recording.]
12:38:59.4 CAM-3 * pull up. [Shouted.]
12:39:00.9 HOT-2 [Unintelligible shout.]
12:39:02.0 HOT-? (oh God). [Shouted.]
12:39:02.0 HOT-2 Lord * * you have my soul. [Shouted.]
1239:03.9 END OF TRANSCRIPT END OF RECORDING
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 21 Dec 19, 13:17Post
The most horrific reading is here. It's sad that this quality was allowed: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=479147&docketID=63168&mkey=99013
Mark 21 Dec 19, 16:19Post
What happened at 12:38:44.0? Sounds like things went from fine to fatal in just 15 seconds or so. Did someone forget their basic piloting skills?
Commercial aircraft flown in: B712 B722 B732 B734 B737 B738 B741 B742 B744 B752 B753 B762 B772 A310 A318 A319 A320 A321 DC91 DC93 DC94 DC1030 DC1040 F100 MD82 MD83 A223 CR2 CR7 E175
miamiair (netAirspace FAA) 23 Dec 19, 09:18Post
Apparently the FO was a boat anchor. Reading his instructor's evaluations, he was an accident waiting to happen. They were right.
And let's get one thing straight. There's a big difference between a pilot and an aviator. One is a technician; the other is an artist in love with flight. — E. B. Jeppesen
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 23 Dec 19, 15:02Post
miamiair wrote:Apparently the FO was a boat anchor. Reading his instructor's evaluations, he was an accident waiting to happen. They were right.


Yes. I didn't realize that it was possible to bumble forward like that. I suppose piloting doesn't have a "recommend removal from the career field" verbiage as ATC does?

Very sad that it was allowed to get to this point. (And I say this with the caveat that I could be 100% wrong about the incipient events—but it seems this poor soul should have been firmly dismissed from this career.)
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 10 Aug 20, 02:55Post
Final report out. FO was clueless and shouldn't have been in charge of anything more dangerous than shoestring. Captain fought him but never asserted positive verbal control. Both were startled and confused, unable to effectively respond. Once the aircraft exited IMC, both pilots began to do the same thing: pull up. That was probably the moment they both realized what was going on, and sadly that they'd be dead within seconds.
halls120 (Plank Owner) 10 Aug 20, 08:05Post
Lucas wrote:Final report out. FO was clueless and shouldn't have been in charge of anything more dangerous than shoestring. Captain fought him but never asserted positive verbal control. Both were startled and confused, unable to effectively respond. Once the aircraft exited IMC, both pilots began to do the same thing: pull up. That was probably the moment they both realized what was going on, and sadly that they'd be dead within seconds.


Years ago my brother (delta 767 captain) was a first officer and was assigned to fly for three days with a captain he had never flown with before. As soon as the trip was finished, he called the Delta Chief Pilot and told him that he would never fly with that captain again, and if DL didn’t do something about it, he was going to kill himself and a quite a few passengers. To their credit, delta investigated and eventually grounded the pilot.
At home in the PNW and loving it
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 10 Aug 20, 14:50Post
halls120 wrote:
Lucas wrote:Final report out. FO was clueless and shouldn't have been in charge of anything more dangerous than shoestring. Captain fought him but never asserted positive verbal control. Both were startled and confused, unable to effectively respond. Once the aircraft exited IMC, both pilots began to do the same thing: pull up. That was probably the moment they both realized what was going on, and sadly that they'd be dead within seconds.


Years ago my brother (delta 767 captain) was a first officer and was assigned to fly for three days with a captain he had never flown with before. As soon as the trip was finished, he called the Delta Chief Pilot and told him that he would never fly with that captain again, and if DL didn’t do something about it, he was going to kill himself and a quite a few passengers. To their credit, delta investigated and eventually grounded the pilot.


My cousin who now flies the Airbuses has told me much the same. He also mentioned to me that there are some people who lose their ever-loving crap just in the simulator and have no clue what they're doing. One guy he simmed with failed to recover from a stall and was panicking the whole time.

It's amazing to me. He used to do aerobatics and said that far, far too many pilots these days have little understanding of how airplanes really work, and almost zero ability to use motor-memory in VMC, and are task-saturated during IMC to the point of being ineffective.

I'd like to think that he's just arrogant, but I'm going to guess that he isn't.
halls120 (Plank Owner) 11 Aug 20, 10:38Post
Lucas wrote:My cousin who now flies the Airbuses has told me much the same. He also mentioned to me that there are some people who lose their ever-loving crap just in the simulator and have no clue what they're doing. One guy he simmed with failed to recover from a stall and was panicking the whole time.

It's amazing to me. He used to do aerobatics and said that far, far too many pilots these days have little understanding of how airplanes really work, and almost zero ability to use motor-memory in VMC, and are task-saturated during IMC to the point of being ineffective.

I'd like to think that he's just arrogant, but I'm going to guess that he isn't.


You are guessing correctly. My brother says that far too many pilots these days are great at programming the flight management system, but not so great when they have to actually hand fly the aircraft.
At home in the PNW and loving it
 

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